5G产业报告-PDF版

区块链服务网络发展联盟：区块链服务网络基础白皮书（18页）.pdf

智能网关服务区块链技术从本质上讲是一种基于共享账本、点对点传输和加密算法的分布式数据库技术。因此仅靠应用链码无法形成复杂的业务逻辑。每个区块链应用的参与方大多有自己的链下业务系统，业务系统与区块链链码.

2021-09-27 18页 5星级

可信区块链推进计划：公有链白皮书1.0版（45页）.pdf

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2021-09-27 45页 5星级

链塔智库：通证经济共同体技术与经济模型——区块链赋能实体经济的基础设施白皮书V0.1（31页）.pdf

经济基础设施通证经济体与通证经济共同体围绕链、通证、社区形成的通证经济体,是在价值互联网中的主要实体。与常见的大型企业或互联网平台不同，一个个通证经济体是由多种主体组成的分布式商业生态，也有人将之直接.

2021-09-27 31页 5星级

可信区块链推进计划：区块链即服务平台BaaS白皮书1.0版（44页）.pdf

分布式的身份管理数字身份管理是未来数字经济、数字中国、数字城市的基础，也是区块链应用大规模应用的必要条件。身份管理是信息系统中不可缺少的功能。在联盟链的区块链系统中，身份管理通常包括两种层面的含义：一.

2021-09-27 44页 5星级

区块链行业专题研究：盘点公链：扩容至深水区DeFi、代付渐成标配（26页）.pdf

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2021-09-23 26页 5星级

2021年NFT定义及应用场景与未来商业价值研究报告（25页）.pdf

阿里巴巴支付宝付款码：2021 年 6 月 23 日，支付宝在“蚂蚁链粉丝粒”小程序上限量发售两款“敦煌飞天，九色鹿”付款码 NFT 皮肤。这两款 NFT 皮肤基于敦煌美术研究所创作的敦煌 IP 推出.

2021-09-18 25页 5星级

计算机行业：区块链系列报告一NFT用户生态新元素元宇宙潜在的经济载体-210917（25页）.pdf

潜在的名人效应。NBA 球星斯蒂芬库里花费 55 ETH(约 18 万美元)购买了 BAYC 的头像，引起了国内外社交媒体对于 NFT 商品的广泛讨论。而在 BAYC 社区，最贵的 NFT 商品价格达.

2021-09-18 25页 5星级

阿里研究院：2021区块链技术激活数字文化遗产研究报告（50页）.pdf

区块链技术 激活数字文化遗产研究 区块链技术 激活数字文化遗产研究 目 录 目 录.1 引 言.-1-一、文博数字化浪潮与区块链的作为.-2-（一）国内外文博文物数字化的现状与瓶颈.-2-（二）疫情.

2021-09-14 50页 5星级

patsnap智慧芽：区块链技术全景分析报告（55页）.pdf

专利市场价值价值概况帮助了解整个技术领域的专利价值概况。当前图表按每组简单同族一个专利代表的去重规则进行统计。专利价值分布通过不同级别的分析，可以更好地评估该技术领域内专利强弱的分布。当前图表按每组简.

2021-08-24 55页 5星级

TokenInsight：2021Q1区块链矿业研究报告（17页）.pdf

矿机投资收益分析在本次报告中,TokenInsight以数字资产市场占有率为标准，主要针对截至2021年第一季度面世的SHA256算法(比特币)与Ethash算法(以太坊)矿机进行投资回报率分析。挖矿.

2021-08-20 17页 5星级

隐私计算联盟&云大所：2021年隐私计算与区块链技术融合研究报告（55页）.pdf

高效的全同态加密方案一直是隐私计算的重点课题从同态加密(Homomorphic Encryption，HE)的概念提出开始，经历了早期的半同态方案、类同态方案之后，高效的全同态加密方案一直是该领域的重.

2021-08-10 55页 5星级

北京市区块链工作专班专家组：北京蓝皮书（141页）.pdf

从“新基建”视角推进政务服务领域区块链应用创新区块链被定义为“新基建”中的新技术基础设施，其“连接”技术的意义凸显，一方面区块链将连接现有的专有网络，服务于政务、金融、工业等专有网络的信息互联;另一方.

2021-08-04 141页 5星级

供应链透明度与采用区块链的融资效益研究（英文版）（35页）.pdf

On the Financing Benefi ts of Supply Chain Transparency and Blockchain Adoption Jiri Chod, Nikolaos Trichakis, Gerry Tsoukalas Henry Aspegren, Mark Weber July 1, 2019 Management Scienceforthcoming Abstract We develop a theory that shows signaling a fi rms fundamental quality (e.g., its operational capabilities) to lenders through inventory transactions to be more e?cientit leads to less costly operational distortionsthan signaling through loan requests, and we characterize how the e?ciency gains depend on fi rm operational characteristics such as operating costs, market size, and inventory salvage value. Signaling through inventory being only tenable when inventory transactions are verifi able at low enough cost, we then turn our attention to how this verifi ability can be achieved in practice and argue that blockchain technology could enable it more e?ciently than traditional monitoring mechanisms. To demonstrate, we develop b verify, an open-source blockchain protocol that leverages Bitcoin to provide supply chain transparency at scale and in a cost eective way. The paper identifi es an important benefi t of blockchain adoptionby opening a window of transparency into a fi rms supply chain, blockchain technology furnishes the ability to secure favorable fi nancing terms at lower signaling costs. Furthermore, the analysis of the preferred signaling mode sheds light on what types of fi rms or supply chains would stand to benefi t the most from this use of blockchain technology. Chod (chodjbc.edu): Carroll School of Management, Boston College; Trichakis (ntrichakismit.edu): MIT Operations Research Center and Sloan School of Management; Tsoukalas (gtsoukwharton.upenn.edu): The Whar- ton School, University of Pennsylvania; Aspegren (): MIT Media Lab Weber (): IBM Research 2) disintermediation, e.g., the ability to provide trust in the absence of a trusted party;43) record integrity, by providing a chain of audit which reduces fraud opportunities; 4) automation, so that tasks such as making loan payments can be automated (Babich and Hilary 2018). In brief, these features can be leveraged to address many of the aforementioned shortcomings including the paper trail ine?ciencies, the need for costly intermediaries, and issues of fraud. There are, however, some potential obstacles that may inhibit the use of blockchain technology in supply chains, or may make it too expensive to deploy. First, it is not obvious to what extent and how exactly blockchains can be successfully ported to provide verifi ability of physical goods transactions, such as procuring inventory. In particular, physical transactions involve a certain amount of human intervention and, therefore, are more susceptible to mistakes or deliberate mis- representation. The ensuing “garbage-in-garbage-out” problem could completely negate the main purpose of blockchain adoption in providing transparency. Second, even if transaction verifi ability can be successfully ported, it is not clear whether blockchain can be deployed in a way that keeps implementation and operating costs low enough to make it relevant to SMEs in developing economies. To this point, there are substantial dierences to consider between private and public blockchain implementations, each having their own advan- (https:/www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/letter-of-credit-fraud). 2Perhaps the most infamous example of falsifying warehouse receipts in asset-based lending is the De Angelis salad oil swindle, which nearly crippled the New York Stock Exchange (Taylor Nov 23, 2013). 3Blockchains were originally designed to solve the infamous double spending problem for digital currency, i.e., to ensure that a digital asset transmitted from one party to another has not already been spent elsewhere. 4In the Bitcoin blockchain, for instance, the task of recording transactions is assigned to individual miners who compete through a proof of work mechanism at every round, to append blocks to the existing chain, in exchange for compensation (composed of transaction fees, and new currency issuance). 4 tages and disadvantages in the context of supply chains. On the one hand, private blockchains have some desirable properties in terms of privacy but 1) are usually not fully decentralized and do not fully eliminate intermediation, 2) have di?culties scaling to achieve adequate security guarantees, and 3) have (relatively speaking) large infrastructure costs. On the other hand, public blockchains, such as the one backing the Bitcoin network, do not suer from these issues, but they do lack some of the desired properties that are important to supply chains, such as identifi cation of verifi ed parties, privacy of data, and transaction costs that are controlled in-network. To demonstrate how these technological and cost issues can be overcome in practice, we devel- oped an open-source software protocol termed b verify. The protocol uses the Bitcoin network to ensure recorded data cannot be retroactively modifi ed or altered. At a high level, the protocol is designed to leverage the infrastructure benefi ts of public blockchains, while taking advantage of several innovations that mitigate some of the aforementioned privacy, identifi cation and transaction cost issues. Unlike previous systems, b verify was designed so that it can provide data integrity at scale and at low cost; it is capable of processing thousands of transactions per second at a fraction of a cent each. More details about the protocol and its key innovations are included in Section 3. In this paper we consider a specifi c use case in agricultural supply chains, demonstrating how the protocol facilitates transaction verifi ability in the context of warehouse inventory. Warehouses often play a central role in supply chains, being frequented by suppliers who deposit inventory, buyers who procure inputs, and banks who utilize warehousing receipts and transactions to process loans (Trichakis, Tsoukalas and Moloney 2015). An enterprise-grade implementation of b verify at this nexus of stakeholder interaction can securely provide, depending on the need, relevant supply chain transanctional information to stakeholders, along with a cryptographic proof that the records are authentic and that no record has been omitted. According to our theory, this in turn should enable high-quality fi rms to use inventory as a credible signaling device and thereby unlock access to favorable fi nancing terms with smaller operational distortions. 1.1Related Literature Signaling models The literature on signaling goes back to the seminal paper by Spence (1973). Whereas Spence (1973) considers only one signaling mechanism (education), herein we allow the informed players to choose between two alternative signaling mechanisms, and study which one prevails in a least-cost separating equilibrium. As we shall see, inventory signaling incurs higher unit signaling costs than cash signaling. While casual intuition could suggest that signaling through the costlier mechanism is automatically more e?cient, a deeper analysis within the classical frame- 5 work laid out by Spence (1973) reveals that this may or may not be the case. Using a generic game, we formally show that if two signaling mechanisms are available that dier only in the unit signaling costs, the high type can prefer the costlier or the cheaper mechanism, depending on the circumstances. In particular, our analysis brings to light the following tradeo. Because the costlier mechanism allows the high type to separate with a smaller distortion, the choice of signaling mech- anism trades o the lower per unit signaling cost of one mechanism against a smaller distortion required to separate with the other. In the context of Spences education signaling, if, say, liberal arts education is costlier than engineering education, a fi rst degree in the former while a postgrad- uate degree in the latter could be required for the high type to separate. We demonstrate that in general, the equilibrium choice of the signaling mechanism by the high type depends the relation between the cost premia of the costlier mechanism for the two types. Within our specifi c context, we fi nd that the inventory/cash signaling cost premia are such that inventory signaling dominates. Signaling to fi nanciers/suppliers Signaling through loan requests to fi nanciers has been well studied in the fi nance literature, going back to Ross (1977) who shows that high-quality fi rms, concerned with short-term valuation, can signal to investors by requesting larger loans. In Besanko and Thakor (1987), lenders screen borrowers using a credit policy consisting of interest rate, loan amount, collateral, and the credit granting probability, and high-quality fi rms signal by borrowing more in equilibrium than they would under full information. Milde and Riley (1988) model a game, in which banks screen borrowers by oering higher loans at higher interest rate, and depending on project characteristics, high-quality borrowers may signal by choosing larger or smaller loans in equilibrium. Duan and Yoon (1993) show that when borrowers choose between spot market borrowing and a loan commitment, high-quality borrowers signal by using larger loan commitments. Signaling through inventory has been studied primarily in the operations management literature in the context of signaling to suppliers and signaling to equity investors. Inventory signaling to suppliers is the subject of Cachon and Lariviere (2001) and Ozer and Wei (2006), both of whom examine how a privately informed manufacturer can credibly share demand forecast with a supplier, which then uses this forecast to build capacity. Taking the perspective of the manufacturer and that of the supplier, respectively, Cachon and Lariviere (2001) and Ozer and Wei (2006) show that the manufacturer can signal by overordering. Chod, Trichakis and Tsoukalas (2018) study supplier diversifi cation in a model that features inventory signaling to suppliers who are also trade creditors. The literature on inventory signaling to equity investors draws upon Bebchuk and Stole (1993), who show that when fi rms are concerned with the short-term valuation and investors observe the investment level, fi rms can signal high productivity by overinvesting. Building on the same premise 6 but in the supply chain context, Lai, Xiao and Yang (2012) show that inventory overinvestment due to signaling can be prevented using a menu of buyback contracts; Lai and Xiao (2018) fi nd that the fi rst-best inventory decisions can be also achieved in equilibrium when the managers short-termism is endogenous; and Schmidt et al. (2015) focus on characterizing pooling equilibria. Our paper contributes to the above literatures by contrasting signaling with loan requests and signaling with inventory, and by establishing the conditions under which the latter dominates. By studying the eect of inventory transaction observability in the context of lending, our paper is intimately related and contributes to the literature on supplier fi nancing. Supplier fi nancing The literature on supplier fi nancing is vast and we only review papers here that are closest to ours. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) show that observability of the input trans- action by the supplier reduces the borrowers diversion opportunities. Considering multiple inputs, Fabbri and Menichini (2016) and Chod (2016) show that transaction observability also reduces the asset substitution problem. Although these papers focus on moral hazard, our work focuses on information asymmetry, where it aords new insights. In particular, the insights in these papers are less relevant in settings in which opportunistic behavior can be alleviated through other means, such as debt covenants, strong legal institutions, and so forth (Iancu, Trichakis and Tsoukalas 2016). Our theory holds irrespective of buyer opportunism. Closer to our work, within information asymmetry models, Burkart and Ellingsen state that “there is no obvious distinction between lending cash and lending inputs” (p. 571).Our work demonstrates that such a distinction does exist: it characterizes the conditions under which an input transaction (inventory signaling) transmits private information about the borrower quality more e?ciently than a cash transaction (cash signaling). The explanation oered by our model is distinct from, and possibly more robust than, existing explanations that rationalize supplier fi nancing based on the assumption that suppliers have an a priori informational advantage over banks (Emery 1984, Biais and Gollier 1997, Jain 2001). Albeit certainly the case in some instances, it is unlikely that fi nancial institutions specialized in developing lending relationships and assessing creditworthiness are systematically disadvantaged relative to suppliers. Our proposed explanation is immune to this criticism because our model assumes a level playing fi eld between banks and suppliers, and identifi es a monitoring advantage of supplier fi nancing that emerges endogenously from the very nature of the transaction and the supply chain transparency it provides. Our theory, although robust to the foregoing criticisms, admits its own limitation, namely, that it is relevant only in the presence of information asymmetry between buyers (borrowers) and lenders regarding the formers creditworthiness. 7 Blockchain literature Most existing literature on blockchains is in computer science, starting with the original white paper by Nakamoto (2008). Given that blockchain technology is very new and still being actively developed, the management literature on the topic is scarce. Babich and Hilary (2018) provide a qualitative discussion of the technologys potential to improve production and distribution networks and implications for operations management researchers. Several papers examine the economics of mining and/or optimal design of blockchain systems, e.g., Biais et al. (2017), Huberman, Leshno and Moallemi (2017), Budish (2018), Cong, He and Li (2019), Hinzen, John and Saleh (2019), Saleh (2019) and references therein. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the fi rst research paper to explore both practical and theoretical implications of blockchains for supply chain fi nance and operations management. A few recent papers, however, have started exploring the impact of blockchain in other areas. For instance, Yermack (2017) examines implications of blockchains for corporate governance, arguing that the transparency of ownership oered by blockchains may upend the balance of power in traditional governance structures. Catalini and Gans (2017) study how blockchain technology could shape innovation by reducing transaction verifi ability costs and bypassing intermediaries. Chod and Lyandres (2018), Gan, Netessine and Tsoukalas (2019) and Chod, Trichakis and Yang (2019) study fi nancing of entrepreneurial ventures by issuing crypto-tokens (ICOs) on ex

2021-08-02 35页 5星级

Dealroom：2021年区块链技术多样化应用报告（英文版）（19页）.pdf

2021年7月15日，Dealroom和Sifted共同主办了一个关于区块链未来的专家小组。虽然区块链相关的头条新闻通常聚焦于动荡的加密价格、引人注目的memecoin采用、欺诈和代币热等疯狂的西部，.

2021-08-02 19页 5星级

国际货币网：区块链与网络借贷平台运营效率——基于DEA数据包络模型的实证分析（21页）.pdf

首先对数据进行平稳性检验，单位根检验结果显示各变量均为平稳序列，由此避免了伪回归。由于该面板模型为长面板模型，为避免异方差影响，实证结果均采用稳健标准误估计。 实证结果表明，区块链发展会促.

2021-07-20 21页 5星级

区块链行业周报：解读Algorand一场持续五年的众筹-190623（13页）.pdf

本周，引人注目的明星公链项目 Algorand 主网正式启动，之前的一周间，Algorand 各节点已经在预上线（Pre-Launch）环境中进行测试。首轮 Algorand 通证拍卖也于北京时间 6.

2021-07-07 13页 5星级

IIM信息：全球及中国区块链行业发展报告（2021年）（62页）.pdf

区块链底层核心技术产品或服务，除了传统硬件制造商提供通用的计算、存储、网络设备外，还包括专用硬件设备。区块链技术组件部分主要包含：共识算法、加密算法、分布式数据存储、智能合约等。前三部分呈现出较明显的.

2021-07-02 36页 5星级

APENFT：2021区块链+艺术白皮书（36页）.pdf

近些年来，随着市场经济的发展，人们对艺术修养要求越来越高，越来越多的人投身于艺术品收藏之中，但传统交易市场本身存在的缺点依然存在，对大众参与艺术交易带来了极大的困难。首先是经济上买不起。对于热衷于艺术.

2021-07-02 36页 5星级

众享比特：安全生产监管区块链应用白皮书（44页）.pdf

安全监管同步模式指利用区块链技术实现各节点达成共识，依据去中心化存储快速同步账本，实现安全监管场景下数据的快速同步与共享，通用场景中被监管的生产或运营环节节点所做的任何动作都将上链存储，共识后同步到相.

2021-07-01 44页 5星级

可信区块链推进计划：区块链供应链协同应用白皮书（60页）.pdf

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2021-06-30 60页 5星级